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BOOK REVIEWS
THE RisE AND FALL OF THE GOLD STANDARD. By Sir Charles Morgan-Webb. Ncw
York: The Macmillan Company. 1934. pp. vii, 187. $1.50.
THE author's experience, according to the blurb, was acquired in India. According
to the foreword the book is a development of talks which he gave to Rotary Clubs.
To this latter fact it is due, undoubtedly, that the presentation of a very intricate
problem is so exquisitely clear, and apparently simple.
He gives the history of the various money standards employed by England before
1816: "No one living in 1816 had had any experience of an efficient silver currency
in England. Since 1730 it had progressively deteriorated, and it had become a
byword for inefficiency." (pp. 44-45). "The new standard was an excellent blend of
all that was necessary to meet the requirements of a new century." (p. 46). It was
a gold standard, expressed in terms of silver, the pound sterling, at a fixed ratio,-
5-3 17s. 103 2d. per ounce. It was designed to be a monetary unit for international
exchange. It justified its purpose from 1816 to 1914, when the dollar became the
unit of value in international trade. For some years after the World War, England
was on an inconvertible paper money basis. England returned to what was called the
"Gold Standard" in 1925, against the protests of manufacturers and laborers. In
the meantime the hoarding spirit had developed. The United States, France, Belgium,
Holland and Switzerland hoarded what gold they could in their central banks. Nations,
debtors to the hoarders, sold goods in England, bought nothing, and transferred credits
to the creditors. England had to find the gold to pay these debts. England had
operated the Gold Standard on a free trade basis, giving the debtor countries an
opportunity to pay their debts in goods. The hoarding countries, with high tariffs,
wanted to sell, but were unwilling to buy. Free-trade England was the debt collector
for them all, and. England had to pay in gold. It was too much. The gold standard
could not be operated on this basis. In the six years-1925-1931-when England
was acting as gold collector for the creditor nations, prices fell, unemployment
increased, and foreign trade was lost-in England.
Finally the hour struck when England could no longer pay in gold the balances
of the debtor countries. She borrowed gold, and was confronted with more borrow-
ing. Then it was-1931-that she went off the "Gold Standard."
The author does not quite do justice to the United States in its effort to finance
foreign trade. During the Coolidge administration, while we annually sold something
near $5,000,000,000 worth of goods abroad, we imported goods exceeding the value
of $4,000,000,000. Besides remittances abroad to meet the expense of tourists, and
to provide for the money sent home by foreign laborers in the United States, a
credit was set up for the debtor countries by bond issues, which were taken by
American citizens. Still Britain's work as a gold collector, especially after the
Hawley-Smoot tariff went into effect, was important; and when it ceased-(when
Britain went off the Gold Standard)-President Hoover declared his moratorium,
The old Gold Standard, in terms of silver-the pound sterling-had been abolished.
What have we today? Inconvertible paper money. For the present the pound
sterling does not mean what it meant between 1816 and 1914. A new unit of inter-
national exchange is developing, based on the Index Number of the value of com-
modities exchanged, and on the balance of trade.
A dictum that might serve as a text on the iniquity of the Hawley-Smoot tariff,
considered in relation to the Gold Standard, is found on page 63: "Protection is an
impossible policy for a creditor country on a gold standard to pursue."
England had made her monetary unit the standard of value throughout the
world for 98 years. When the United States replaced England, it failed to realize,
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or to observe, the rules of the game. The old "sterling" game was played out. A
new game of international exchange,- based on the index number of prices, is de-
veloping. Gold is no longer currency. It is a commodity-for hoarding.
In the Gold Clause Cases, Chief Justice Hughes of the United States Supreme
Court, reading the opinion of the majority of the Court, declared: "We are of
opinion that the gold clauses now before us* were not contracts for payment in
gold coin as a commodity, or in bullion, but were contracts for the payment of
money.'31
"We also think that, fairly construed, these clauses were intended to afford a
definite standard or measure of value, and thus to protect against a depreciation of
the currency and against the discharge of the obligation by a payment of lesser
value than that prescribed." 2
"If the gold clause applied to a very limited number of contracts and security
issues, it would be a matter of no particular consequence, but in this country
virtually all obligations, almost as a matter of routine, contain the gold clause. In
the light of this situation two phenomena which have developed during the present
emergency make the enforcement of the gold clauses incompatible with the public
interest. The first is the tendency which has developed internally to hoard gold;
the second is the tendency for capital to leave the country."3
The hoarding of gold, at home and abroad,--that is what has made it impossible to
operate trade on the gold standard.
Justice McReynolds in his oral dissent is quoted as having said: "The Constitution
is gone." Perhaps this remark might be paraphrased in language suggested by Pro-
fessor Corwin, of Princeton: "The old Super-Constitution is gone." 4
In view of the judgment pronounced by the Supreme Court of the United States,
the history of the gold standard, as related in this book, is particularly interesting
to the lawyer.
JoHN X. PYNE, S. J.-
CAN oN LAw. By Archbishop Amleto Giovanni Cicognani. Authorized English
Version by Rev. Joseph M. O'Hara, Ph.D. and Rev. Francis Brennan, D.D., J.U.D.
Philadelphia: The Dolphin Press. 1934. pp. xiv, 887. $5.
That the Canon Law is not a thing apart, as so many common-law lawyers have
come to think, is abundantly shown by a careful reading of these lectures of Arch-
bishop Cicognani, put into book form at the request of his students when he was
Professor of Canon Law in the Pontifical Institute of Canon and Civil Law at
S. Apoilinare, Rome, later revised and enlarged and now translated into simple and
exact English for the use of American readers generally. The author has brought
to bear upon his subject a wealth of learning gathered through the centuries from the
sources and traditions lying behind the Canon Law and from conceptions and
doctrines of Roman, Germanic and civil law. Jurisprudence and legal philosophy
of the various schools from Aristotle to the time of the present code, though touched
upon only incidentally, are marshaled in a way that portrays the author's thorough
understanding of the historical, scientific and philosophical aspects of law generally.
This commentary on the Canons of Book I of the Code, with an introductory study
1. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 55 Sup. Ct. 407, 413 (1935).
2. Ibid.
3. Id. at 418
4. Coawm, TwnIGHr op Tim Supnrx- CouRt (1934) 182.
t Regent, Fordham University, School of Law. Author, THE MIND (1925).
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and with a comprehensive elaboration of the sources thereof, had for its purpose
according to the translators, the presentation of "a complete treatise on the elements
of Canon Law" which would serve "the same function in Canon Law as the treatise
on Fundamental Theology does in Dogmatic Theology."1  As the first book deals
with the general phases of the subject, it is the most interesting part for students
of Roman Law, for jurists, and for lawyers. The following admonition to all canonists
might well be taken seriously by many writers in the common law:.
"Some seem to give only the dry bones of law and not the flesh and blood; others
bury the genius of the subject under a mass of antiquity; some do not treat at all
of the causes of things and the record of antiquity; still others, carried away by a
desire to appear erudite, seem to speak of nothing but antiquity."2
Part I, Chapter I, deals briefly but informingly with such juristic matters as the
essential concept of law, justice and equity, the nature of law, its source and origin,
the schools of natural and positive law, the law of nations among the Romans and a
general historical view of civil law, as backgrounds for the study of the sources of
Canon Law, almost every line of which is quite as valuable reading for students of
the common law. In Chapter II a jurist of today would find himself at home at
almost every turn, for here again the author in dealing with the sources of Canon
Law, touches pertinently, though only incidentally, upon tradition, custom, unwritten
law and the juristic conceptions and philosophy of such men as Hobbes, Bentham,
Kant, Spinoza, Comte and Bergbohm.3 Rousseau, Fichte, Savigny, Puchta and others
are compared with Vice in the treatment of natural and positive law. 4 The author
objects to the historical school's casting aside the theory of natural law when in
reality the two schools are not in any way inconsistent, as the former seeks the
immediate source of law in tradition and custom, whereas the latter deals with the
ultimate sources which have their roots in philosophy. Nor are the relations of
natural law, the law of nations and civil law overlooked as backgrounds.8 The
divisions of the Corpus Juris of Justinian are also explained.0 and finally the con-
clusion is reached that Canon Law is a science involving sources of and basic
relations between Roman, Germanic and modern civil law, evidenced by an historical
approach to such topics as prescription, conjugal fidelity, divorce, paternal authority
and so on.7 For example, the method of computing degrees of consanguinity as
found in Canon 96 came from the Germanic law.8 Case study by historical and
analytical methods is urged, and the author in exfoliating the doctrines under each
Canon deems*it necessary to go into the cases in which it has been applied.0 This
method is consistently applied in Part III, which is a commentary on the first book
of the Code. The sources of Canon Law, extensively treated in Chapter III, are of
course of less interest to the common-law lawyer.
Part II, Sections I and II, deal again more extensively with the history and
sources of Canon Law, including internal and external history, classifications of
1. P. v.
2. P. 6. Quoted by the author from Devoti's "Preface to the Eager Young Student
of Canon Law."
3. P. 18 et seq.
4. P. 20 et. seq.
5. P. 34.
6. P. 38 et seq.
7. P. 47 et seq.
8. P. 51.
9. P. 57.
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canonical collections, with a note on public collections, historical notes on the au-
thority of the Supreme Pontiff and a treatment of Oecumenical and Particular
Councils.O Section IM is devoted to the history and classification of collections and
of the science of Canon Law. Herein the author gives a very thorough treatment
of the collections in three parts: (1) from the Pseudo-Apostolic through the Oriental
and Ancient Latin Collections to those from the ninth to the twelfth century,
followed by a treatment of the science of Canon Law in this epoch;"1 (2) From
the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries, including herein the Dccrctunt of Gratian,
collections of the Decretals before Pope Gregory LX, those of Gregory, and those
following, which include the "Liber Sextus" of Boniface VIII, the Constitutions of
Clement V, the "Extravagantes" of John XII, the "Extravagantes Communes," and
the Corpus Iuris Canonici, followed by the Rules of the Apostolic Chancery and by
a survey of the science of Canon Law in this second epoch;' 2 and (3) Collections
and other materials from the Council of Trent to the Pian-Benedictine Code, includ-
ing among other matters the sources of law relating to the Protestant Sects, and
followed by a treatment of the science of Canon Law in this epoch.' 3 Finally, in
Section IV, the reasons and necessity for codification, the form, order, authority
and interpretation of the Code, are dealt with.
What will attract at this point the attention of the American lawyer, over and
above the high degree of scholarship inherent in the author's work, are the reasons
for codification,14 which are on the whole quite similar to those given for codifica-
tion of the German Civil Code, of our Uniform Laws, and of our Restatements by
the American Law Institute-all characteristic of periods of maturity of law.
Part IHI, which is a commentary on each Canon of Book I of the Code, completes
the volume. After an extended treatment of the first Eight Canons, this division
deals with the Ecclesiastical Laws,' 5 Custom,10 Computation of Time,17 Rescripts,28
Privileges,' 9 and Dispensations.20 "Book I of the Code is of especial interest to
common-law lawyers as it deals with basic conceptions and doctrines applicable to
the entire Code. For those interested in statutory interpretation Canons 12-15 are
pertinent, but Canons 17-20 have a substantial similarity to our own canons of
construction in the common law. Similarly, the treatment of the nature of law21
its elements, the division of law,22 its sanction or obligation including its prom-
ulgation, cessation or repeal23 show theories quite familiar to anyone dealing with
problems of the relation of the common law to legislation.
On the question of sanction the author makes dear that "a command, in no sense
a mere exhortation, which a subject is morally obliged to obey," 24 is what dis-
tinguishes a law from mere counsel. To the analytical jurist this definition would not
10. Pp. 131-181.
11. Pp. 182-264.
12. Pp. 265-342.
13. Pp. 343-412.
14. Pp. 413-418.
15. Canons 8-24.
16. Canons 25-30.
17. Canons 31-35.
18. Canons 36-62.
19. Canons 63-79.
20. Canons 80-86.
21. Pp. 523-531.
22. Pp. 532-533.
23. Pp. 536-640.
24. P. 524.
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of course be acceptable .in any way, as the only sanction he can see for law is the
physical force of the superior behind the command to his subjects. The primary
sanction for Canon Law is, on the other hand, the reason, intrinsic moral force, and
justice of the command. The essential difference of course between the Canon and
civil law in this respect is that the former can bind the conscience, although the
power of excommunication at certain points is a sanction characteristic of the
analytical jurists; whereas in the latter the moral sanction, though extremely im-
portant, can not alone make law enforceable. At this point in the discussion sharp
clashes between the concepts of analytical jurisprudence and those of natural law are
clearly discerned. The treatment of legal, commutative and distributive justice,
beginning of course with Justinian's three precepts, has also a modern ring. For
example, "since an individual is part of the community," says the author, "every
individual, in all that he is, belongs to the whole, wherefore nature inflicts a loss on
the part, in order to save the whole; so that on this account, enactments which impose
proportionate burdens are just and bind in conscience and are laws."2 5 This would
seem to be about as far as we should care to go in present legislation today, and
some unquestionably would hesitate to go so far. Whether this basic doctrine is
laid down by the author for Catholics only in respect of their obligations, moral and
legal, to the Church or whether he would apply it to civil law generally is hardly in
doubt inasmuch as, at this point, he is writing on the nature of law in general,
Interesting also to the common-law lawyer is to compare the author's treatment of
internal acts with juristic acts of civil law, the legal significance of which is so
largely dependent upon the states of mind accompanying them.2 0 Basically the
internal act or state of mind as distinguished from its non-juridical character in the
civil law when not accompanied by overt action is all that is necessary to a contra-
vention of certain portions of the Canon Law for the very reason that this law not
only binds the conscience, but the conscience from the standpoint of enforceability
can also be examined. This process is naturally beyond effective legal action in the
civil or common law. Similarly, discussion of personal and territorial theories of
law27 and the position of the conflict of laws as we find it here takes for the common.
law lawyer a peculiar turn in meaning in that it signifies apparent conflict in the
laws themselves, although it also may mean of course at certain points a choice
between competing Canons as well; whereas for the common-law lawyer the term
signifies, first of all, a choice of law from competing systems of independent
sovereigns and secondarily a choice of the proper precept or precepts of the system
so chosen. It never means actual conflict-only an apparent conflict-within a
single body of law; for within a single system of law as a unit there can never be
an actual conflict in the law. Doctrines of prospective and retrospective interpreta-
tion28 including questions as to when retrospective interpretation can affect vested
rights, are quite interesting to us, because the reasoning and premises at this point are
similar to our own. And so the author goes on, through repeal,29 custom in relation
to law3° and the counting of time,31 all of which every common-law lawyer might
do well to read thoroughly, for these doctrines as interpreted for Canon Law are
of daily occurrence in common-law practice. They are conceptions and doctrines
which are wholly basic in our own law.
25. P. 525.
26. P. 528.
27. P. 533.
28. Canon 10, pp. 555-559.
29. Canons 21-23.
30. Pp. 641 et seq.
31. Pp. 666 et seq.
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In short, the whole work is done extensively and intensively with a high degree
of scholarship, authority and scope of juristic understanding; and, as the author
deals with the history and sources as well as general doctrines of the entire Code, it
is indispensable to any student, teacher or priest who has to interpret and apply the
Code. For the common-law lawyer this work has an abundance of instructive
doctrines not irrelevant by any means to a basic understanding of his own law. What
is more important, however, than all of this is (to repeat what was said at the
outset) that the work demonstrates the fact that the Canon Law is not a thing apart,
but must be considered with all seriousness in the study of comparative law today.
The translators have done an excellent job in turning this work into simple, clear
and understandable Englisht The retention of the Canons in the Latin likewise
prevents error in meaning. They have made a leading treatise available to American
scholars, many of whom might not otherwise have access to it, and for this in itself
they deserve much credit. A tripartite index by names, subjects and Canons is
given. This will also make the book a manual of ready reference for those applying
the law directly to new situations.
FR ERICK J. DESLOOVhE.'
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE ov LAW. By Frederick C. Hicks and Elliott P. Katz.
Baltimore: Lord Baltimore Press (American Bar Association). 1934. pp. xi 207. $1.
As the author of the foreword states, there has been a rising tide of discontent over
the growing encroachment of corporations and laymen upon the field of the legal
profession. And complaints have been directed not only against such corporations
and laymen, but as well against those lawyers who have cooperated in such encroach-
ments.1 In 1930, the American Bar Association created a special committee on the
Unauthorized Practice of Law. In 1933, this was made a standing committee. In
the Annual Convention of 1934, the committee reported that "interest in the Un-
authorized Practice of the law has never been greater throughout the country than at
the present time".2 The committee further notes that the situation remains highly
controversial as evidenced by litigation existing between the Bar and corporate
fiduciaries "in St. Louis, Detroit, Colorado, and California", and the committee
further points out, "the most acute problem at the present time lies in the field of
commercial law.' 3
In view of this aggravated situation, the authors have published what they
describe as "a handbook for the use of laymen and lawyers needing information
concerning the Unauthorized Practice of Law." The book is divided into four parts:
the first part (47 pp.), sets forth all the existing statutes relating to Unauthorized
Practice; the second part (60 pp.), contains a digest of cases relating to Unauthorized
Practice under many different headings, but grouped chiefly under "natural persons"
and "corporations and associations." The last pages of this section give the seven
types of remedies which have been invoked against such abuses; the third part
(50 pp.), gives a statement of principles adopted by Bar Associations, Trust Com-
panies, and Associations of Fiduciaries; and the fourth part (35 pp.), contains an
excellent bibliography of writings on Unauthorized Practice. The work concludes
with a Table of Cases and Index.
t Professor of Law, New York University Law School.
1. Foreword, J. G. Jackson, p. 3.
2. American Bar Association, Advance Program, 1934, p. 191.
3. Id. at 198.
4. Foreword, p. 7.
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This is the first work of its kind and furnishes an excellent starting point for all
further investigation and writing upon the subject. It merits the vote of appreciation
which it received from the American Bar Association committee, and the further
endorsement which it received from the American Bar Association.
B'y its very nature the work is a compilation. The authors have indicated in the
foreword the omission of any controversial articles. They seem to have made the
omissions reluctantly, and the reviewer regrets that they did not include a number
of representative articles by parties on both sides of the controversy. Assenting to
the compilers' statement that such inclusion would have led them away "from the
impersonal and the objective," the reviewer feels that such material is necessary
for any well-informed consideration of the issues involved.
It is interesting to note that practically every state has enacted legislation relating
to Unauthorized Practice. The digest of cases covers a wide variety of situations
and will be a real time-saver to one searching for authorities. The digest is done
well in the main, although in a few instances the statement is too compressed to
give the desired information.6
The section which deals with statements of principle adopted by Bar Associations,
Trust Companies, and Associations of Fiduciaries, while it is restricted simply to
the reprinting of such agreements, gives a graphic picture of the whole situation.
The language varies from preambles and professional professions of "a spirit of
mutual helpfulness and cooperation" to straight statements of fact that "it is a
fundamental principle of this relationship that trust institutions shall not engage
in the practice of law".1 The statements vary greatly. Some confine themselves
to a statement of principles. Others enumerate specific instances of forbidden con-
duct.8 It is interesting to note that some of these statements are by Bankers'
Associations or Bar Associations. Others are working agreements, and one in
particular is an agreement between the Title Insurance Company and the Governors
of the State Bar of California, in consequence of which an action against the
Company was dismissed.0 Four statements of principles are included for organiza-
tions in the states of New York and Ohio.
The fourth part contains a rich bibliography with brief notes concerning the
articles mentioned. The Table of Cases and an Index complete the work.
As a factual compilation this work is deserving of unqualified praise. The reviewer
may venture to suggest, however, that there is a real need for an added critical
collection of excerpts from available writings upon the subject for a clarification of
the issues involved. A volume of such writings compiled by the scholarly authors
of this work would certainly be welcome as an useful addition to the source-material
on this important and irritating legal problem. REV. ROBERT J. WV~roe..+
CASES ON COMMON LAW PLEADING. By James P. McBaine. St. Paul: West Pub-
lishing Co., 1934. pp. xi, 300. $3.00.
THIS case-book is meant for law students who are beginning the study of law and
is intended to give them a foundation upon which to build a well-rounded, but not
5. E.g., Lapique v. Superior Court, p. 63; People v. Hubbard, p. 64.
6. P. 130.
7. P. 125.
8. P. 132.
9. P. 130.
t Lecturer of Law, School of Law of Catholic University of America. Author, TUC
LAWYER AND His PROFESSION; THE LEGAL EFrEcr OF ANTE-NvPTIAL PROMISES.
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exhaustive, knowledge of the procedural side of the common law in both its historical
and practical aspects. The book is divided into two parts. The first two-thirds of
the volume is devoted to cases discussing the forms of action; the remainder deals
with the subject of pleading at common law. The editor estimates that it can be
covered in about thirty-two class periods.
The amount of space given to the forms of action is not disproportionate to that
given to the rules of pleading. It is generally agreed that even in the jurisdictions
which have abolished the common law forms of action in favor of the formless action,
the common law forms cannot be ignored. The student who aspires to be a well-
educated lawyer is bound to be interested in the history and development of the
system of law which now governs the English speaking countries, and in this history
and development the forms of action occupy a central position. One who com-
mences a study of the substantive law is apt to be surprised to find that goodly
portions of it first developed out of the forms of procedure. It seems to have
been characteristic of most legal systems that attention was first directed to the
matter of remedy and that it gradually came to be perceived that behind the remedy
were rights and duties.1
Professor McBaine evidently had this in mind when he arranged the cases in the
first part of his new case-book, for we find that in each of the chapters dealing with
the actions of Trespass, Case, Replevin, Detinue, Ejectment and Trover--the forms
of action classified as ex delicto-a section under the title "The Defendant's Act"
is followed by a section under the title "The Plaintiff's Right." By this arrangement
he neatly leads the student to see how the substantive law grew out of the struggles
over form, and, when the chapter is finished, the reader also finds that he has
learned not a little substantive law. This classification of the cases under "The
Defendant's Act" and "The Plaintiff's Right" is unique, so far as the writer knows,
and it seems to be a sound and logical arrangement.
Another innovation in this book is the addition to every chapter dealing with the
forms of action of a section containing a case which brings out the modem significance
of principles developed in the preceding cases. This is done "because," to quote the
preface, "it has seemed desirable to demonstrate to beginning law students that
vestiges of the old system remain in modem procedure." Even in the jurisdictions
which, like New York,2 have abolished the formis of action as such, cases are con-
stantly cropping up which show that an understanding of the nature of the old
actions is still necessary to the practicing lawyer. So late as 1931 the New York
Court of Appeals found it necessary to look into the old form of action in Debt
when it was called upon to construe Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice.3 One
who reads the cases which the editor has collected under the title "Modem
Significance" will be convinced that a general knowledge of the common law forms
of action has a "bread and butter" value as well as a cultural one.
The editor states that he has sought to put before the student well-knovm or
frequently cited cases in the first part of the volume. Not only has he succeeded in
that aim, but he has also selected cases which can be understood after a fair amount
of study. Here and there unfamiliar words and latin phrases are met with which
might have been profitably explained or translated in notes, but the reader can, of
course, look them up in the law dictionaries.
The last third of the book deals with the rules of pleading relating to the demurrer,
1. nm-x, EARLy LAW AxD CusrO m 389; PouND, SPIrI Or 'H Comio, Lxw, 204;
III STRE, FoUNDATioNs OF LEGAL LTxaBILn, c. I.
2. NEW Yoan Cwmi PRAcmcz Acr § 8.
3. Rule 113 provides for summary judgment "in an action to recover a debt or liquidated
demand.' The case is Waxman v. Williamson. 256 N. Y. 117. 175 N. E. 534 (1931).
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declaration, negative pleas in bar, the specific and special traverse, affirmative pleas
in bar, pleas in abatement and replications. It is not the object of the editor in this
part to make the student an expert common-law pleader, but to acquaint him with
the nature of the system and its major features. In line with these objects, only
the declaration and affirmative pleas in the two important actions of trespass and
assumpsit are studied.
Throughout the book the editor has, on the whole, avoided cases containing law
French, latin tags, and elliptical Chaucerian English, which have been so common in
case-books of common law pleading, and which have been the despair of beginning
law students. The object of the book being to sketch the major features of the
system and not to compile a source book of cases which first laid down the rules,
it would seem desirable to select more modem and understandable cases to illustrate
the workings of the rules than has been the custom in the past. Professor McBaine
occasionally trespasses in this regard, however, and a few of the good old mysteries
like Cole v. Maunder4 are found. No doubt a case-book on common law pleading
without a few cases which no beginning law student could be expected to understand
even after a reasonable amount of study would be unconstitutional.
The growing practice of printing problem cases in the notes has been adopted
by the editor throughout the book. At the end of each section the facts of several
cases are stated together with the judgment of the lower court. The citation of the
case on appeal is then given, but the result of the appeal is not stated. The student
is thus encouraged to "attempt a solution, and later read as many of the cited
cases as time will permit for a deeper and wider understanding." Citations to helpful
texts and law review articles are frequent and well chosen.
GEORGE W. BACON.1'
THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS. By Harry Weinberger. Berkeley Heights, N. J.:
Oriole Press. 1934. pp. 39. $1.50.
THis little book is extremely interesting and should be read by every person who
believes in the now cherished principles of freedom of the press and independence
of the Bench and Bar. It consists of two addresses, "The Liberty of the Press"
and "Andrew Hamilton," delivered by Harry Weinberger, Esq., a gifted member of
the New York Bar, and one of the directors of the New York County Lawyers'
Association. The former address was delivered before the Philadelphia Bar Associa-
tion in Independence Hall, Philadelphia, on March 9, 1934, upon the occasion of the
unveiling of a tablet to the memory of Andrew JHamilton. The second address was
delivered at the "Home of Law" of the New York County Lawyers' Association,
when a tablet was dedicated and presented to the Association in memory of Hamilton.
It was in the "Areopagitica" that John Milton uttered the famous words "Give
me liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all
liberty."
Almost 200 years ago, in 1735, no New York attorney could be obtained to
defend John Peter Zenger, accused of criminal libel, because his two New York
lawyers, who had challenged the jurisdiction of the court, had been disbarred for
that reason. Zenger had published a newspaper in which he printed criticisms of
the British Government and its Colonial officers in New York. Zenger was arrested,
charged with criminal libel. The Governor of the Colony of New York and all
4. 2 Rolles' Abridgment 548.
McBAm-E, CASES ON CoMMroN LAw PLEADING (1934) 170.
t Associate Professor, Fordham University, School of Law.
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of the forces of the British Government were seeking to obtain a conviction. On
Zenger's side were most of the citizens of the Colony. Zenger's friends asked the
aid of Andrew Hamilton of Philadelphia, at that time eighty years of age and the
leading advocate of America. Although in bad health this great lawyer undertook
the defense of Zenger without compensation.
The trial was held August 4, 1735, in the Supreme Court of New York Colony
at the old city hall, which at that time was located at the comer of Wall and Nassau
Streets. Hamilton contended that the language had to be false as well as scandalous
and seditious in order to obtain a conviction of criminal libel. He cited the pre-
cedent of the great trial of William Penn in England, telling that though the court
in that case ordered the jury to find Penn guilty, "the jury did not think fit to
take the court's word for it" and acquitted Penn.
Hamilton pleaded to the jury:
"Let us at least do our duty, and like wise men (who value freedom) use our utmost
care to support liberty, the only bulwark against lawless power, which in all ages has
sacrificed to its wild lust and boundless ambition the blood of the best men that ever lived."
At the close of his address the court wished the jury to bring in a special verdict
that Zenger printed and published, leaving to the court the question of law whether
there was a libel. Hamilton argued, the jury had the right and power to decide the
law and the facts. The jury brought in a verdict within ten minutes of not guilty.
The trial first established in North America the legal principle that in prosecutions
for libel the jury are the judges of both the law and the facts.
The liberty of the press thus was secured from assault and destruction. The right
of criticising the conduct of public men was confirmed and fortified. In recognition
of Hamilton's services the Common Council presented him with the freedom of the
City of New York.
Mr. Weinberger has performed a valuable public service in publishing his two
interesting and eloquent addresses, which commemorate, as he so well puts it, the
memory of a great lawyer in "rededication to the ideal of freedom and a free people."
I. MAURiC E Wornusmt
A T EATIsE ON THE LAW oF TORTs. By Fowler Vincent Harper. Indianapolis: The
Bobbs-Merrill Company. 1933. pp. cxi, 714. $5.
A perusal of the table of contents of a treatise on Substantive Law not infrequently
affords a revealing and accurate knowledge of its value and worth as a text-book.
This book is no exception. Its table of contents discloses that the author has a
considerable grasp upon the doctrinal outlook of his subject. Its grouping and
integration are logical and rational and display a power of analysis which is indicative
of the scholarship and virtuosity which would be expected from one who has for
years been conspicuous in this field of the law.
Avowedly, Professor Harper makes no claim or pretense of presenting a work on the
law of Torts of any great originality. His preface announces that the raison d',tre
of the volume is two-fold: first, to correlate under one cover modem ideas about
tort law; second, to emphasize the many notions of social policy underlying the
development of this branch of the law.
With respect to the first major objective, the author admits that his chief source
Profe-sor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law. Former editor of NEw Yonn
LAw JouRNAL. Author, DisR.RD oF T= CoasonaTE FicnoN Am AL= Cononowo!
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19351
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
has been the great mass of material that has found utterance through the media
of law periodicals during the last quarter century. The annotations of his text give
ample evidence of this admission.
In the attempted attainment of the second major objective, the burden of his
thesis is that the unitary character of tort law is to be gleaned, not from its
doctrinal development but from the broad notions of policy from which these
doctrines are derived. "It is this social, rather than legalistic basis of tort law
that affords the unifying principles." (p. vi).
When he commences, however, to expound his ideas about the social policy of the
law of torts, it is obvious that he rejects all attempts to interpret social phenomena
upon an appreciation of purely subjective values. He is actuated by the idea that
any effort to make the criteria of social good necessary and a priori will inevitably
lead to the canonization of indefensible error. "In attempting to set forth any
body of knowledge in logical and systematic form," he says, "it is highly desirable
that the postulates be explicit at the outset. These postulates are a priori propositions,
in'capable of final demonstration from a rational point of view. They are to be
regarded as tentative assumptions set up, not because they have any validity as
proved propositions, but because they afford the equipment to make an intelligible
organization and presentation of the material to be studied.... The rational aspect of
the law is ex post facto. . . .Law is relational. This is an implication concealed
in the notion of law. It derives from the empirical fact that law arises out of or
emerges from social activity. . . .Just how the genius of the race conceived of law
as a device to effect a part of this control is a great mystery" and referring to
society as composed of interested men, he says "it is these interests that demand
and dictate the mores, habits and laws of a community." (pp. 1-3).
Such a theory tells us nothing about ends and little about means. It rejects
anything like invariant laws. In it only a purely functional theory possesses or offers
any prospect of adequacy. Excluding with abhorrence the natural or moral law,
based on immutability of principle which brooks no change and knows no compro-
mise, the postulates of such a school operate on the theory that right and wrong
depend solely upon positive legislation and judicial decision. Pragmatism is made
a principle of law; expediency a principle in the interpretation of the law.
Now it is conceivable that opinion might rationally differ as to the value of a
purely functional approach as a pedagogical method of teaching law or legal prin-
ciples, provided the basic postulates of such a teaching method recognize the im-
mutable laws of nature, which Blackstone characterizes as "the Eternal Laws of
Good and Evil which the Maker has enabled reason to discover for the conduct
of human actions." This so-called functional approach in method is merely an
attempt to synchronize education more closely with life. It is part of an educa-
tional ferment extending from the grade school to the university. In the mind of
Professor John Dewey, the school should be a minature workshop and its students
should learn through trial and error.
But when the basic predicates of a philosophy of law are empirical and when its
implication derives from the empirical fact that law arises solely out of or emerges
from social activity, as Professor Harper audaciously states, then criticism must
transcend mere method and attack basic philosophy. It is obvious that Professor
Harper has been infected with the virus of the Realist school with all its attendant
errors.
When the author takes leave of theory, however, and undertakes the discussion
of the doctrines applicable to invasions of interests in personality and property,
which is only another way to state the compass of the field of tort, the book is
commendable. Concededly, the work is designed primarily for law students and
its structure suggests a teacher to choose and expound. Its exposition is authorita.
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tive and its style graceful. It is copiously annotated and documented and includes,
as already stated, generous references to articles in law reviews and law periodicals.
Neither has the Restatement of the Law of Torts been neglected, and both in text
and note, the rules adopted by the American Law Institute are advocated by
Professor Harper, especially where the interests of liberalization suggest or require.
From the legalistic point of view, the volume is a noteworthy addition to the
text law of torts. It is an adequate tribute to the influence and thought which
Professor Bohlen has contributed to this branch of Substantive Law, and Professor
Harper in his preface gives frank and honest attribution and credit to this ac-
knowledged master for the general direction and, in many instances, the particular
conclusions arrived at in the volume.
ARTHUR A. McGmm t
t Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
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